Abstract. In this paper, we revisit the problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of MSR codes under the passive {l1, l2}-eavesdropper model, where the eavesdropper has access to data stored on l1 nodes as well as the repair traffic for an additional l2 nodes. We analyze the secrecy capacity of MSR codes from an information theory perspective. Specifically, we investigate the basic reconstruction and regeneration properties of MSR codes and find some information theoretic features on the contents of storage nodes as well as repair traffic. Leveraging these properties with a definition of the secrecy capacity, we derive new upper bounds on the secrecy capacity for MSR codes. These explicit upper bounds on the secrecy capacity bring out an interesting fact that the secrecy capacity of MSR codes is not only related to {l1, l2}, but also closely depends on β, the amount of data downloaded from each helper node during the repair process. Similar bounds on the secrecy capacity in the literature are either restricted to the situation that l2 ≤ 2, or based on the assumption of linear coding. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel characterization of the secrecy capacity of general MSR codes without the above constraints.
INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSSs) are an essential part of large scale data storage systems required for many new emerging distributed networking applications such as social networking, video sharing, peer to peer networking and large scale data centres. As is common in such storage systems, redundancy is indispensably introduced to ensure reliability and availability owing to frequent node failures. The main approaches to introduce redundancy in DSSs are through replication, erasure coding, and more recently using regenerating codes [3] . Erasure coding in general can achieve higher reliability for the same level of redundancy when compared to the schemes that provide replication [7] . Regenerating coding is a recent innovation that has superior performance over erasure coding for efficient repair of failed nodes in DSSs [24] .
Regenerating Codes.
Regenerating codes have gained popularity in recent years as an efficient repair coding technique. So far, many approaches have been proposed for the construction of regenerating codes such as product matrix construction [9] , interference alignment techniques [10, 11] and methods using complete graphs [12] . In the regenerating-code framework [3] , a file of size B is split into nα symbols and then dispersed across n nodes, where all the symbols are drawn from a finite field F q and each node stores a collection of α symbols. The dispersing manner requires that any data collector can retrieve the original data message by connecting to any k out of n nodes. The node repair can be accomplished by permitting a new node to connect to any d helper nodes from the surviving (n − 1) nodes by downloading β ≤ α symbols from each node. For brevity, we represent a regenerating code with the parameter set {n, k, d, α, β, B}, where dβ is the total data transferred for node repair and is termed as repair traffic bandwidth.
The cut-set bound based on the concept of information flow [4] requires that the maximum possible size B of a data file must satisfy:
In [3] the authors characterize the information theoretic tradeoff between the per storage α required at each node and repair bandwidth dβ. The codes that can achieve the tradeoff curve are termed as regenerating codes. Two extreme points on this tradeoff curve are of particular concern, namely, minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) point and minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point, respectively representing codes with least repair bandwidth and ones with the least per node storage. As shown in [3] , there exist some inherent properties within the parameters of MBR and MSR codes as follow:
Besides, three repair models are considered in the literature: functional repair, exact repair, and exact repair of systematic nodes [24] . Exact repair can regenerate the exact replicas of the lost data in the failed nodes and thus is clearly preferred in the practical systems [6] . Although regenerating code is a good solution to reduce repair bandwidth upon node failures, there are still many other design challenges faced by DSSs such as security [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] , local-repairability [18, 19, 20] , optimality of updating [21, 22, 23] , etc. Our concern in this paper is on securing DSSs against eavesdroppers attempting to obtain any knowledge of the original data.
Secure Regenerating Codes.
Since the nodes of a DSS are widely spread across the network, individual nodes may be compromised and as a result stored data is vulnerable to eavesdropping. There are mainly two kinds of attacker models considered in the literature: passive eavesdropper and active eavesdropper models [2] . Compared to the former, under active eavesdropper model adversaries can modify the data or even inject new ones into the compromised nodes. Our adversary model considered in this paper is the passive model as given in [15] . In this model adversaries have access to the data stored on l 1 nodes as well as the repair traffic for additional l 2 nodes. Here we only consider the situation of 1 exact repair. Related work: The issue of designing secure regenerating codes against eavesdropping was firstly addressed in [14] and [15] . The authors in [14] considered the initial setting that an eavesdropper observes the contents of l < k nodes of the storage system, and analyzed the regenerating code's secrecy capacity (secure file size), the maximal file size that can be securely stored. An upper bound of the secrecy capacity and a MBR coding scheme that can attain this bound is proposed in [14] . Extending the initial eavesdropping setting [14] , authors in [15] modeled the eavesdropper as one getting access to the data stored on l 1 nodes as well as the repair traffic for additional l 2 nodes, with l 1 +l 2 < k. The secure productmatrix-based MBR coding scheme proposed in [15] can achieve the bound derived in [14] with l = l 1 + l 2 . Achievability of the bound for secure product-matrix-based MBR codes in [15] can be attributed to the fact that the repair traffic bandwidth dβ equals with per node storage α in the MBR scenario. In other words, the (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropper cannot obtain any extra information other than the contents of l = l 1 + l 2 nodes in the MBR scenario. Hence, under the (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropper model, the upper bound in [14] still holds for the secure file size B (s) of MBR codes:
where l = l 1 + l 2 . Authors in [15] further considered the design of secure MSR codes based on productmatrix codes, but their secure MSR coding scheme is only capable of storing (k−l 1 −l 2 )(α−l 2 β) size secure file which attains the bound (3) only when l 2 = 0. The intuition here indicates the (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropper can obtain more information than the contents of (l 1 + l 2 ) nodes in the MSR scenario, as the repair traffic bandwidth dβ is larger than α = (d − k + 1)β that is actually stored in those l 2 nodes needing repair. Since then, the characterization of the secrecy capacity for MSR codes is considered to be open under (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropper model. Recently, the authors in [16] claimed that the secrecy capacity of any secure (l 1 , l 2 )-MSR codes is tightly upper bounded by (k − l 1 − l 2 )(α − l 2 β) and subsequently shown that the product-matrix-based secure MSR codes in [15] meet the bound. However, a new upper bound on the secrecy capacity for MSR codes with l 2 ≤ 2 is derived in [18] and the authors in [18] demonstrate that Zigzag codes of [21] , a class of MSR codes, achieve this bound. When l 2 = 2, this attainable bound is equal to (k − l 1 − 2)(α − 2β + β n−k ) which is evidently larger than (k − l 1 − 2)(α − 2β) (the corresponding bound in [16] ). We will address this apparent contradiction in detail in this paper.
The authors in [16] introduce an information theoretic formulation of maximum file size that can be stored securely using any regenerating code. This significant result can be viewed as a fundamental definition of the secrecy capacity of any regenerating code. In this paper, we will develop this definition and further present new upper bounds on the secrecy capacity of general MSR codes.
Also recently, some new upper bounds are built on the assumption of linear coding in [17] , which is capable of addressing the secrecy capacity of some specific MSR codes such as Zigzag codes. When l 2 ≤ 2, these bounds match to those in [18] .
Contributions: In this work we begin a study on the inherent features of secure MSR codes from an information theory perspective, where the data stored in storage nodes and transferred by helper nodes during repair are considered as random variables. Based on the basic reconstruction and regeneration properties of MSR codes we derive two useful properties: (i) the repair traffic from disjoint sets of nodes under a node failure are mutually independent, and (ii) that given the contents of a node and the repair traffic from any k−1 nodes, the remaining repair traffic from an additional d−k+1 nodes are deterministic. Using these two new properties, we first demonstrate the equivalence of the secrecy capacity of a MSR code having parameters {n, k, d, α, β, B}, with the corresponding truncated code having the parameters {d+1, k, d, α, β, B} under the passive {l 1 , l 2 }-eavesdropper model. Then combining the properties with the definition of the secrecy capacity for MSR codes given in [16] , we derive a simple and generally applicable upper bound on the secrecy capacity of MSR codes. Subsequently, based on the fact that β must be taken from non-zero integer values, we present a tight characterization of the secrecy capacity of MSR codes in the situations when 1 ≤ β < d−k+1 l2−1 . A consequence of this result when β = 1 naturally establishes the optimality of product-matrix-based construction for secure MSR codes whenever l 2 ≤ {k − 1, d − k + 1}. It should be noted that the product matrix construction of the MSR codes requires β = 1 as an essential condition [9] .
We also give the upper bounds in the other situations when β ≥ d−k+1 l2−1 , which are in fact improved generalizations of the results given in [17, 18] . By putting all together, we finally present explicit upper bounds on the secrecy capacity for general MSR codes, which closely depend on the value of β. These upper bounds are divided into two categories, absolutely tight upper bounds and conditionally tight upper bounds. In contrast to the previous results in [17, 18] , our upper bounds are not restricted to the linear-coding assumption or any constraint on the value of l 2 . In other words, we give a specific characterization of the secrecy capacity for general MSR codes under the passive (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdropping model in all situations.
Organization: Section 2 gives preliminaries about system model and some important properties of MSR codes from an information theory perspective. Section 3 presents the main contributions about the new upper bounds of general MSR codes. Section 4 lists some new questions. Section 5 concludes this paper.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some basic concepts and calculus related to information theory are quoted, which will be used in high frequency later. Subsequently we describe the system model of secure MSR codes from the information theory perspective, following which several special and important properties of MSR codes are given. 
Definition 2.
[1](Chain Rules): Chain rules for entropy and mutual information are:
Lemma 1. Based on the above definitions of information entropy, we can easily obtain
Proof. From the above definitions, it must have
And,
System Model
We follow the information theory approach introduced in [8] and accodingly treat all data symbols including data stored at the storage nodes and those transferred by helper nodes during the repair operations as random variables. Note: Throughout the paper, we only consider the situation of MSR codes with parameter set {n = d+1, k, d, α, β}, because the general situation of secure MSR codes with {n > d+1, k, d, α, β} is equivalent to the truncated one with {n = d + 1, k, d, α, β} in terms of the secrecy capacity, which will be detailed in Theorem 1.
We represent nodes using indices 1 to n and denote the sequence of nodes [i, i + 1, · · · , j], i < j by [i, j]. We use symbols for a set {. . .} and a sequence [. . .] interchangeably.
Notations: Given any MSR code with parameter set {n
denote the random variable corresponding to the content of node i. This then implies that H(
} denote the set of random variables corresponding to the nodes in the subset A. Throughout the paper, subscripts of W can represent either a node index or a set of nodes which will be clear from the context.
, i = j denote the random variable corresponding to the data symbols sent by the helper node i to the replacement of the failed node j. This then implies that H(S
Reconstruction as well as regeneration property of any MSR code can be expressed as
Adversary Model: Let E be a set of l 1 nodes which the eavesdropper has access to, and F be another disjoint set of l 2 nodes whose repair traffic can be observed by the eavesdropper. In other words, the eavesdropper is assumed to have the knowledge of {W E , S F }. Furthermore, we assume l 1 + l 2 < k, or the eavesdropper can retrieve all of the data message. Due to the above adversarial model, we set G to be another subset
The secrecy capacity B (s) has the following property.
Lemma 2.
[16] For any secure regenerating code, we have
Remark 1. This bound can be viewed as a fundamental definition of the secrecy capacity in the form of information entropy, since
exactly indicates the size of data file that can be stored securely given the data information the eavesdropper can access. Actually, it is obvious that
. Thus, we only need to concentrate on the term H(S F |W E , W F ) in this paper.
Properties of MSR Codes
Now we proceed to provide some important properties, which stem from the reconstruction and regeneration properties of MSR codes. With these properties, we can further simplify the formulation H(S F |W E , W F ) mentioned above.
Lemma 3. In the scenario of MSR codes with parameter set {n, k, d, α, β}, consider any two subsets A ′ and B ′ with {|A
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume i = 1. The proof is given in two steps as follows.
1. According to the Property 2 in [8] , it is trivial that I(W 1 ; W A ′ ) = 0 in the MSR scenario, which leads
). Due to the node repair property, it must have H(
. Now, we present some key inequalities based on Lemma 1:
. . .
By summing up the left side of the inequalities, we derive
Because α = (d − k + 1)β, it is mandatory that all the inequalities (12) actually are equations. Thus, for
from which we can deduce 
where E, F and G are pairwise disjoint sets as defined above and |E ∪ F ∪ G| = k. Furthermore, when
Because |(E, F, G) \ i| = k − 1, based on the second item of equation (11), we have
So, H(S
In addition, the above proof is obviously applicable in the situation when E = ∅.
Remark 3. Combining this lemma with Lemma 2, we obtain for any secure MSR code
which is also proposed in [16] but has not been proven to be tight. This inherent formula H(S F |W F ) = H(S Proof. From Lemma 4, we have
where
When |G ′ | = 1, we get, for any two different g 1 and g 2 where
which indicates H(S
which implies H(S
Due to the randomness of (g 1 , g 2 ) and (g ′ , g ′′ ), then for arbitrary different i 1 , i 2 where
Remark 4. Lemma 5 shows that the information entropy of repair traffic from any two nodes assisting in repairing the same subsets of nodes are identical. This feature is highly important and will be used in the proof of many results given in this work.
NEW UPPER BOUNDS FOR GENERAL MSR CODES
In this section, we first show the equivalence of determining the secrecy capacity of any MSR code with {n > d + 1, k, d, α, β} to that of the MSR code with {n = d + 1} having all other parameters remained unchanged. Then we present a simple and general expression of upper bound. Subsequently, we present two categorized upper bounds, namely, absolutely tight upper bounds and conditionally tight upper bounds. Furthermore, by putting all together we derive explicit upper bounds on the secrecy capacity B (s) of general MSR codes. These bounds not only can generalize those results given in [16, 17, 18] , but also characterize the secrecy capacity for general MSR codes without the constraints referred in the literature.
Equivalence of Secrecy Capacity of MSR Codes
Although the authors in [16] have claimed that any upper bound on the secrecy capacity of MSR codes with parameter set {n > d + 1, k, d, α, β} also holds for MSR codes of length {n = d + 1} with all the remaining parameters left unchanged, we believe it's not trivial without leveraging our Lemma 3. Actually, their claimed argument on truncating operation is only applicable in the initial eavesdropping model where the eavesdropper only has access to the contents of l 1 nodes. Under the (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdropping model, the eavesdropper also can observe the repair traffics of an additional l 2 nodes, where the repair traffic of each node needing recovery may come from different sets including any d helper nodes. The different repair strategies will make it difficult to compare the joint entropy of repair traffic between these different sets of helper nodes in the MSR scenario. Thus, the argument on truncating operation [16] is not applicable in the (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdropping model. Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume M ′ is comprised of the nodes set [1, d + 1] truncated from M. We set the same subsets E, F, G for M and M ′ . Lemma 2 indicates, for any secure regenerating code, 
First, according to the first term of equation (11) in Lemma 3, we know
Then, from the second term of equation (11) in Lemma 3 and the repair property that regeneration of any failed node can be recovered by connecting to any d of the (n − 1) remaining nodes, we have
where 2 Q 1 is the subset of Q of size d − k + 1. Because Q 1 is a random subset of Q, we obviously have
So, combining equation (26) with (28), we are to easily derive H(S
, which implies the repair traffic of node 1 is fixed and independent of the choice of the set of helper nodes.
Remark 5. Theorem 1 indicates the secrecy capacity of secure MSR codes does not depend on the parameter n but the remaining parameters {k, d, α, β, B}, which enables us to restrict attention to a fixed subset (d + 1) nodes out of n nodes of MSR codes or just focus on the MSR codes with the parameter set {n = d + 1, k, d, α, β}.
A Simple and General Expression of Upper Bound
Theorem 2. For any secure MSR code,
where g ∈ G, |G| = k − l, l = l 1 + l 2 and |F | = l 2 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. Proof. Lemma 4 tells us that, in the MSR scenario, we have the following tight upper bound
where l = l 1 + l 2 , |G| = k − l and l ≤ k − 1. Lemma 5 implies that, in the MSR scenario, for any subset F such that |F | ≤ k − 1 and for arbitrary g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, we have
Combining the inequality (30) with equation (31), we easily obtain the tight upper bound (29).
Remark 6. Theorem 2 can be viewed as a simple way to define the secrecy capacity B (s) , since this bound is tight. So, in order to compute the specific bound, we actually only need to calculate or estimate the value of H(S F g ), where g / ∈ F .
Absolutely Tight Upper Bounds on the Secrecy Capacity
Here, we will give specific and tight upper bounds on the secrecy capacity of MSR codes with 1 ≤ β <
l2−1 and as a result prove the optimality of the secure product-matrix-based MSR codes introduced in [15] . Before that, we first explain the reason why β must be taken from integer values. In the design of all the regenerating codes referenced in the literature, each storage node contains α data units and transfers β data units for repairing a failed node, where each data unit is always drawn from a finite field and thus viewed as the smallest data block with capacity 1 information unit. Such an intuition indicates that for any two different data units X 1 and X 2 , I(X 1 ; X 2 ) can only be taken by 0 or 1 but not a fractional value. This notion will be used by default in the proofs given in Appendix.
Based on the fact that β must be taken from integer values and the general upper bound (29), we give some tight characterizations of the secrecy capacity of MSR codes as below. Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
With Theorem 3, we get the following corollary: Corollary 1. In the MSR scenario, when β = 1, we have the specific upper bound as
Corollary 2. The product-matrix-based construction of secure MSR code is optimal for any l 2 ≤ min{d− k + 1, k − 1}.
Proof. First, the product-matrix-based MSR codes constructed in [9] set β = 1. Then according to the construction of secure MSR codes in [15] , the {l 1 , l 2 }-secure MSR codes achieve
So the construction of secure MSR codes in [15] attains the bound on the secure file size given in Corollary 1; hence the upper bound tightly characterizes the secrecy capacity of MSR codes in the situation when β = 1. Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
With Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3. In the MSR scenario, when β ≥ 1, the following tight upper bound still holds
Remark 7. In this category, tightness of these upper bounds can be attributed to the fact that H(S ) cannot be exactly calculated and only can be estimated, which will be shown subsequently.
Conditionally Tight Upper Bounds on the Secrecy Capacity
In the other situations when β ≥ d−k+1 l2−1 , we cannot exactly calculate the value of H(S F g ). We can only estimate the range of value that H(S F g ) can be taken from.
The situations when
Theorem 5. Given an {d + 1, k, d, α, β} MSR code, for l 1 + l 2 ≤ k − 1 and l 2 = t + 1, when
where π(β, l 2 ) = tβ +
Proof. It can be derived from equations (46) and (47) in the proof of Theorem 4. When
t−1 , it follows from Corollary 3 that π(β, t) = tβ. According to the proof of Theorem 4, we have for any i /
where θ ∈ Z∩[0, β]. Because d−k+1 t ≤ β, when setting θ = β−1, we derive (d+1−k)(β−1) ≥ (d−k−t+1)β, from which we cannot get the contradiction. We only can deduce that (46) and (47). Thus, we have
where l = l 1 + t + 1. Due to equation (37), π(β, l 2 ) can be set to be exactly equal to tβ +
Remark 8. As we can only have a coarse estimation of the inequality (47), the tightness of the bounds in this situation stays unclear. However, the Zigzag codes [21] considered in paper [18] ( 3 Theorem 18) can attain this upper bound when α = (n − k) k and l 2 = 2, which implies that the attainability of the upper bounds in these situations is conditional. In addition, the upper bound restricted to l 2 ≤ 2 given in Corollary 16 in [18] is a particular case of our Theorem 5.
3.4.2
The situations when l 2 = t + e, e ≥ 1,
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
Remark 9. Actually, the upper bound given in [17] (Theorem 3) is also a special case of our Corollary 4. The upper bound on the secrecy capacity for their linear coding in [17] is achievable for the Zigzag codes [21] with α = (n−k) k . Based on our Theorem 1, n can be equivalently replaced by d+1.
, only the case of t = 1 satisfies the constraints on β. Hence, we get l 2 = e+1, from which we obtain π(β, 
Remark 10. Corollary 4 is the supplementary and augmentation of Theorem 5, which expands the range of values that l 2 can be taken from. In Theorem 5, e only can be taken by 1, while Corollary 4 takes e by any value only needing to satisfy l 1 + t + e ≤ k − 1. However, in this category, H(S F g ) or π(β, l 2 ) can only be estimated, while its precise value may vary from different parameter sets of MSR codes. Nevertheless, some our estimated upper bounds are still achievable for the Zigzag codes considered in paper [17, 18] . These imply that the upper bounds in this category are conditionally tight.
Putting All Together
Now combining the two categorized upper bounds with the claim about the equivalence of secrecy capacity of MSR codes, we give the following characterization of the secrecy capacity for general MSR codes. Given any secure MSR code with specific parameters {n, k, d, α, β, l 1 , l 2 }, the following Theorem 6 will provide the corresponding upper bound of the secrecy capacity. However the tightness of upper bounds in some situations is conditional.
3 In [18] , the secure Zigzag code is designed by setting α = (n − k) k and l2 = 2. As our Theorem 1 indicates, n can be set to be d + 1, with which we obtain α = (d − k + 1)
According to our Theorem 5, we find t = 1 meets the condition corresponding to β = (d − k + 1) k−1 ≥ d − k + 1 and thus our Theorem 5 is applicable in the situation when l2 = t + 1 = 1 + 1. In particular, π(β, 2) given in [18] is written to be 2β
β which is exactly equal to 2β t−1 , Corollary 4 along with the fact that all the entropy of data information must be taken from integer values, require that π(β, l 2 ) must be taken by the minimal integer value larger than tβ + β(
e .
FURTHER THOUGHTS
Theorem 6 presents the explicit upper bounds on the secrecy capacity for any MSR codes given the specific parameters set {k, d, β} and (l 1 , l 2 )-eavesdropping model. As shown above, these upper bounds are divided into two categories from equation (40).
which is tight according to the two equivalent definitions of the secrecy capacity for MSR codes from Lemma 2 and Theorem 2. The secure product-matrix-based MSR codes given in [15] can meet this bound, which indicates the attainability of the bound in the situation when β = 1. But, it's still open to construct secure MSR codes that can achieve these bounds in other situations when 1 < β < d−k+1 l2−1 within this category. In addition, when l 2 = t + e,
, whose tightness is uncertain due to formulas (47) and (51). Nevertheless, Zigzag codes [21] considered in paper [17, 18] both can achieve the bound in the situation when β = (d+ 1 − k) k−1 ≥ d+ 1 − k, which corresponds to t = 1. That is to say, the bound's tightness in this category is conditional. Thus, whether it's feasible to construct secure attainable MSR codes in all other situations when {l 2 = t + e, 1 < t
, is an interesting research question.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the problem of determining the secrecy capacity of MSR regenerating codes. We assume the passive adversarial model where adversaries can observe the contents of certain nodes and also observe repair traffics of some other nodes. While the secrecy capacity of MBR codes has been characterized completely [14] , it is challenging to analyze the secrecy capacity of MSR codes [15, 17, 18] . The additional difficulty comes from the fact that the amount of data downloaded for node repair in MSR codes is not entirely stored on the new node undergoing repair, making it challenging to compute the joint entropies of the repair traffic. With such a system model, we focus on investigating the repair traffic in the MSR scenario from an information theory perspective. We obtain explicit upper bounds on the secrecy capacity for general MSR codes which closely depend on the value of β, the amount of data downloaded from one node during repair. These bounds can explain and generalize the previous results in [16, 17, 18] . Although we give a characterization of the secrecy capacity for general MSR codes without the constraints referred in the literature, constructing secure MSR codes that can achieve our upper bounds in all situations (40) remains open. 4 In the situation when l2 = t + e and
Through analysis, we find the latter term
+ 1 ≤ eβ − e + 1 ≤ eβ. So in these cases, π(β, l2) < (t + e)β = l2β, which is in line with the fact H(S 
which can be deduced from
In one way, since we have
In another way, we have
can be straight deduced from Lemma 4 and G ′ , G ′′ are defined as equation (22) 
Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. Without loss of any generality, we assume the set of l 2 nodes are [1, t + e], where t + e + l 1 ≤ k − 1. According to Lemma 5, we know H(S 
which can be derived as inequality (47). Then, combining equation (50) with (51), we derive (d − k + 1)θ e ≥ α − tβ + θ 1 + · · · + θ e−1 , from which we get
Through rearrangement, it can be changed into
Here, we set ω(e) = θ 1 + · · · + θ e . Thus, we obtain
From Theorem 5, we know θ 1 ≥ d−k−t+1 d−k+1 β. Hence, by recursion and induction, we get
Therefore, H(S ) e and we can set π(β, l 2 ) to be exactly
